granted that the task of ethics is the delineation and human institutions, traditions, impelling interests clarification of choices; it is essentially the task of and occupations. ' interpreting rules or principles in such a way as to JOHN DEWEY illuminate the various moral implications which different choices involve. Such a process is, of course, fundamental to ethics. Yet this particular under a major, unexamined assumption. The who feel they have a right to know how much pain and disfigurement to expect will feel rebuffed by the physician who, sensing he is being asked the impossible, responds abruptly that he will 'do whatever is necessary '. Sociologists of medicine have been interested in such clinical encounters for some time, interpreting them within sociological categories such as 'affective norms' and 'behavioural patterns'. Ethicists have been less interested in the fine detail of such encounters and usually focus exclusively on the explicit decision-making process. Yet clinical encounters such as the two depicted above disclose value agendas within the behavioural patterns. They disclose modes of moral reasoning which often remain at a tacit level, precisely because these encounters comprise the routines of clinical medicine. They constitute the substance of the physician's professional life and for this reason are not subject to frequent examination.
Three layers in the perspectives of physician and patient A recent article in the Journal of the American Medical Association typifies the conventional view. It asserts that since there now appear to be 'systematic ethical differences between the layman and the professional', even at the theoretical level, 'the physician must learn to understand and accept the views and decisions of patients'.7 Such a view assumes that the layman's perspective is normative. No mention is made of any reciprocal responsibility laymen might have to understand and accept the views of their doctors. It is presumably on the terms of the lay norms alone that any conflict of opinion must be adjudicated.
I agree that there are ethical differences between physicians and laymen, but these differences are not surface differences of opinion. They are rather differences in custom and tradition, differences in sources used for ethical insight, and differences based in diverse understandings of the ritual dramas in which patients and doctors find meaning in their work, their illness and their therapies. It should not be assumed a priori that one mode of ethical reasoning is superior. It may well be that conflicts in values between physicians and patients should be adjudicated with a bias toward the patient's perspective, yet no such general principle should be established or practised until there is greater effort to map the decision-making process which is enacted in the clinic. By assuming that our commonality as persons should and will override all differences, ethicists have excused themselves from the hard work and the cultural shock of clinical exposure. At a minimum, clarification and adjudication of value conflicts in medicine depend upon appreciation of and respect for the diverse modes of decision making between doctors and patients at a variety of levels.
Decision making in medical ethics is comprised of three identifiable levels or layers: i) the weighing of alternative choices, the process of choosing; 2) the explicit deliberation of the implications of choices in terms of codes, rules or principles; and 3) the formulation of the issues through value assumptions. For 
